Washington must get tough on Kinshasa to bring peace to Congo
5 min read
Nearly a year since Congo and Rwanda initially signed a U.S.-backed peace agreement, Washington’s push to bring peace and prosperity to Africa’s troubled Great Lakes region remains in limbo. If the Trump administration wants to secure the historic Washington Peace Accords, it must lean on its new Congolese allies to uphold their side of the bargain.
The United States has recently come down hard on Rwanda and its M23 allies—and rightfully so. Rwanda backed a M23 military offensive to capture Uvira, South Kivu province’s second biggest city, as President Donald Trump was hosting Congolese President Félix Tshisekedi and Rwandan President Paul Kagame to finalize the Washington Accords peace framework late last year. The move was a slight to the administration’s mediation efforts to end the latest three-year iteration of a decades-long conflict and incentivize peace with billions of dollars of U.S. investment.
The United States has responded furiously, taking some of its most drastic actions against Rwanda in over a decade. Washington slapped sanctions and visa restrictions on senior Rwandan officials in early March. In late April, the Treasury Department imposed sanctions on former Congolese President Joseph Kabila for providing financial and political support to M23, and the State Department is rumored to have denied Kagame a visa to attend an event at Harvard University. Most notably, the Rwandan army (RDF)—a key institutional and economic pillar in Rwanda—has become only the second U.S.-sanctioned African national army.
On the other hand, Tshisekedi and the Congolese government have gained favor with the Trump administration. After months of negotiations, Congo signed a comprehensive strategic partnership agreement with the United States in late December, which guarantees U.S. firms access to the rich Copperbelt region and will see Congolese critical mineral exports redirected westward toward the Atlantic Ocean via the U.S.-funded Lobito railway. Kinshasa has also aligned itself with the administration’s immigration policies, agreeing to take in U.S. deportees from Latin America and potentially the Middle East.
One would think that Congo is behaving like a model peace partner, but this is far from the truth. While M23 has been largely on the defense since December and even ceded ground in response to U.S. demands, the Congolese army and its partners have only increased drone and ground attacks, sometimes killing civilians in urban areas. In Qatari-mediated talks with M23, Kinshasa also continues to stall initial confidence-building measures on spurious technicalities.
Most importantly, Kinshasa has failed to end its support for nonstate armed groups. Senior Congolese army officials sabotaged these half-hearted efforts, while the government itself has continued to channel millions of dollars each month to unruly militias who regularly attack M23. These militias include the notorious Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), an extremist Hutu armed group linked to the 1994 Rwandan genocide that Rwanda regards as a security threat, which Kinshasa has even increased collaboration with recently.
By not putting pressure on Kinshasa, the Trump administration risks undercutting the incentive structure of its own peace deal and alienating important partners in the wider region, including Congo.
On the Congolese side, Tshisekedi has little incentive to negotiate in good faith, with M23 or anyone else in Congo, if he thinks he has full U.S. backing. Tshisekedi still views M23 as an illegitimate actor that must be dealt with militarily and still believes he can defeat the group despite repeated battlefield setbacks. U.S. political—and possibly even military—support only strengthens this belief, with Tshisekedi citing U.S. actions as underwriting his maximalist viewpoint.
On the flip side, Rwanda and M23 have less incentive to participate in a peace process they think is biased, rigged or otherwise unproductive. Kagame has criticized the U.S. approach and said Rwanda will not “capitulate.” Punitive measures that only target Rwanda also reinforce long-standing autarchic-leaning perceptions in Kigali that the international community is hostile. Without Rwandan buy-in, neither military action by Kinshasa nor diplomatic pressure by the U.S. is likely to displace an entrenched M23.
Zooming out, the U.S. is indirectly enabling a controversial power grab that risks its long-term partnership with Congo. Tshisekedi has weaponized the continuation of the war to justify rewriting the constitution to delay elections and seek a third presidential term. He is using the Washington Accords and threat of U.S. sanctions to justify crackdowns on the opposition by labeling opponents as M23 and Rwandan sympathizers. In response, the opposition has criticized the Congo-U.S. partnership. This threatens the partnership once Tshisekedi and his lackeys are no longer in power, which could come any time in a country as unstable as Congo.
The United States must put more pressure on Congo, beginning with the Washington Accords. The administration should push the Congolese government to immediately cease collaboration with and launch imminent military operations to neutralize the FDLR in accordance with its Washington Accords obligations. The U.S. should consider targeted sanctions on Congolese officials obstructing this campaign and withhold defense cooperation with the Congolese army until Kinshasa complies.
The Qatari-led negotiations are separate but closely linked with the Washington Accords, and here too the Trump administration will have to work on Tshisekedi. Washington should privately pressure Kinshasa to negotiate in good faith and make concessions on crucial issues for a feasible Congo-M23 deal, which U.S. officials call the “last piece of the puzzle,” particularly agreeing to some form of short-term M23 transitional control over current M23-controlled territory. The United States should simultaneously help Tshisekedi absorb any resulting domestic political backlash by giving him tangible deliverables through the critical minerals partnership.
The only way to secure the peace and prosperity the Trump administration seeks is by holding all parties accountable, including its allies in Kinshasa. The U.S.-backed peace deal offers Congo and Rwanda numerous carrots, and the U.S. pressure on Rwanda was a much-needed stick after Kigali flouted the peace deal. But now, Congo is playing spoiler under Washington’s nose. To secure the promise of peace and partnerships built over the last year, U.S. officials must act.
